To address how technological progress in …nancial intermediation a¤ects the economy, a costly-state veri…cation framework is embedded into the standard growth model. The framework has two novel ingredients. First, …rms di¤er in the risk/return combinations that they o¤er. Second, the e¢ cacy of monitoring depends upon the amount of resources invested in the activity. A …nancial theory of …rm size results. Undeserving …rms are over …nanced, deserving ones under funded. Technological advance in intermediation leads to more capital accumulation and a redirection of funds away from unproductive …rms toward productive ones. With continued progress, the economy approaches its …rst-best equilibrium.
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(JEL E13, O11, O16) American Economic Review, forthcoming Financial development "accelerates economic growth and improves economic performance to the extent that it facilitates the migration of funds to the best user, i.e. to the place in the economic system where the funds will earn the highest social return," noted Raymond W. Goldsmith (1969, p. 400 ) some thirty …ve years ago. Information production plays a key role in this process of steering of funds to the highest valued users. If the costs of information production drop, then …nancial intermediation should become more e¢ cient with an associated improvement in economic performance. Improvements in the e¢ ciency of …nancial intermediation, due to improved information production, are likely to reduce the spread between the internal rate of return on investment in …rms and the rate of return on savings received by savers. The spread between these returns re ‡ects the costs of intermediation. This spread will include the ex post information costs of policing investments, and the costs of the misappropriation of savers' funds by management, unions, etc., that arise in a world with imperfect information. There may be no change in the rate of return earned by savers over time, because aggregate savings will adjust in equilibrium so that this return re ‡ects savers'rates of time preference. If the wedge between the internal rate of return earned by …rms and the rate of return received by savers falls, due to more e¤ective intermediation, then both the economy's capital stock and income should rise. Additionally, if capital is redirected away from the less productive investment opportunities in the economy toward more productive ones then the economy's output will rise further and productivity move up. In fact, empirical research strongly suggests that …nancial development has a causal e¤ect on economic development-see Ross Levine (2008) for a masterful survey. Speci…cally, …nancial development leads to higher rates of growth in the capital stock, income and productivity.
To address the impact that …nancial innovation has on economic development, a general equilibrium model of …rm …nance, under competitive intermediation, is presented. At the heart of the framework developed here is a costly-state veri…cation paradigm that has its roots in classic work by Robert M. Townsend (1979) and Stephen D. Williamson (1986) .
The model here has two novel ingredients, though. First, in the standard costly-state veri…cation paradigm the realized return on a …rm's investment activity is private information.
This return can be monitored, but the outcome of this auditing process is deterministic: once monitoring takes place the true state of the world is revealed with certainty. This is true whether or not a deterministic decision rule for monitoring is employed, as in Townsend (1979) or Williamson (1986 Williamson ( , 1987 , or a stochastic one is used, as in Ben Bernanke and Mark Gertler (1989) or John H. Boyd and Bruce D. Smith (1994) -see also Townsend (1979, Section 4) . By contrast in the current setup the outcome of monitoring is random. Speci…cally, the probability of detecting malfeasance depends upon the amount of resources devoted to policing the returns on a project and the e¢ ciency of the monitoring technology. In the model a project's funding and level of monitoring will be jointly determined. The information asymmetry between the …rm and the intermediary gives the …rm an opportunity to exploit its private knowledge about the realization of the investment return. In particular, it can extract rents from the intermediary, and hence savers.
Second, a …rm's production technology is subject to idiosyncratic randomness. This is true in the standard costly-state veri…cation framework as well. Here, though, there is a distribution across …rms over the distribution of these returns. In particular, some …rms may have investment projects that o¤er low-expected returns with little variance, while others may have projects that yield high-expected returns with a large variance.
Two key features in the analysis follow from these ingredients. First, the setup yields a …nance-based theory of the equilibrium size distribution for …rms. This theory derives from the facts that: (a) investment opportunities di¤er in the expected returns and levels of risk that they o¤er and (b) producing information about these returns is costly. A simple threshold rule for funding results. All …rms with an expected return at least as great as the cost of raising capital are funded. Funding is increasing in a …rm's expected return, and is decreasing in its risk. Loan size is determinate for a given type of project because the costs of …nancing a project are increasing and convex in the level of the monitoring activity. Thus, high mean projects receive limited funding because the costs of monitoring will rise disproportionately with loan size. The riskier a project is, the bigger is the di¤erence between the returns in good and bad states. This increases the incentive for a …rm to lowball its earnings in good states. Hence, more diligent monitoring will be required, which increases its …nancing cost. In an abstract sense, one could think that the diminishing returns in information production modeled here provide a microfoundation for Robert E. Lucas's (1978) span of control model. Second, the framework provides a link between the e¢ ciency of the …nancial system and the level of economic activity. Such a tie was developed earlier in the models of Valerie R. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) , Greenwood and Boyan Jovanovic (1990) , Levine (1991) , and Albert Marcet and Ramon Marimon (1992) . The analysis here provides a crystal clear delineation of the Goldsmith (1969) mechanism, however. It stresses the connection between the state of technological development in the …nancial sector, on the one hand, and capital accumulation, both along the extensive and intensive margins, on the other. If technological improvement in the …nancial sector occurs at a faster pace than in the rest of the economy, then …nancial intermediation becomes more e¢ cient. Loans are monitored more diligently and the rents earned by …rms shrink. Additionally, lending activity will change along both extensive and intensive margins. Projects with high-(low-) expected returns will now receive more (less) funds. Those investments with the lowest expected returns will be cut. At high levels of e¢ ciency in the …nancial sector the economy approaches the …rst-best equilibrium achieved in a world without informational frictions. This reallocation e¤ect distinguishes the analysis from earlier research by Shankha Chakraborty and Amartya Lahiri (2007) and Aubhik Khan (2001) that also embed the standard costly-state veri…cation framework into a growth model. In these frameworks all …rms receive the same amount of capital.
I The Environment
Imagine a world resting in a steady state that is made up of three types of agents: consumer/workers, …rms and …nancial intermediaries. In a nutshell, …rms produce output using capital and labor. The consumer/worker supplies the labor, and intermediaries, the capital.
All funding for capital must be raised outside of the …rm. Financial intermediaries obtain the funds for capital from consumer/workers. They also use labor in their lending activity.
Output is used for consumption by consumer/workers and for investment in capital by intermediaries. The behavior of …rms and intermediaries will now be described in more detail.
The consumer/worker plays a more passive role in the analysis, which is relegated into the background by assuming that he supplies one unit of labor and saves at some …xed interest rate, b r.
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II Firms
Firms produce output, o, in line with the production function
where k and l represent the inputs of capital and labor used in production. The variable gives the productivity level of the …rm's production process. Productivity is a random variable drawn from a two-point vector ( 1 ; 2 ) with 1 < 2 . Let Pr( = 1 ) = 1
and Pr( = 2 ) = 2 = 1 1 . The mean and variance of are given by 1 1 + 2 2 and 1 2 ( 1 2 ) 2 , respectively. Thus, for a given set of probabilities these statistics di¤er in accordance with the values speci…ed for 1 and 2 . The realized value of is the …rm's private information. Now, the productivity vector, , di¤ers across …rms. In particular, suppose that …rms in the economy are distributed over productivities in line with the distribution function
F (x; y) = Pr( 1 x; 2 y).
Think of this distribution as somehow specifying a trade-o¤ between the mean and variance of project returns. Due to technological progress in the production sector of the economy, this distribution will evolve over time. Figure 1 plots an illustrative density function for F in mean/variance space.
The …rm borrows capital, k, from the intermediary before it observes the technology shock, . It does this with both parties knowing its type, . It can employ labor, at the wage rate w, after it sees the realization for . In order to …nance its use of capital the …rm must enter into a contract with a …nancial intermediary. Last, note that a …rm's production 1 Think about a representative consumer with time separable preferences over consumption. The steady state interest rate will then be given by b r = 1= 1, where is his discount factor. 
A Pro…t Maximization by Firms
Consider the problem faced by a …rm that receives a loan in terms of capital in the amount k.
The …rm hires labor after it sees the realization of its technology shock, . It will do this in a manner so as to maximize its pro…ts. In other words, the …rm will solve the maximization problem shown below.
The …rst-order condition associated with this maximization is
Substituting the solution for l into the maximand and solving yields the unit return function,
Think about r i = R( i ; w) as giving the rate of return on a unit of capital invested in the …rm given that state i occurs. The expected rate of return will be 1 r 1 + 2 r 2 , while the variance reads 1 2 (r 1 r 2 ) 2 .
III Financial Intermediaries
There is a competitive intermediation sector that borrows funds from consumers and lends capital to …rms. While the intermediary knows a …rm's type it cannot observe the state of a …rm's business either costlessly or perfectly. That is, the intermediary cannot costlessly observe , o and l. The …rm will make a report to the intermediary about its business situation. The intermediary can devote some resources in order to assess the veracity of this report. The payments, p, from a …rm to the intermediary will be conditioned both upon the report made by the former, and the outcome of any monitoring activity done by the latter.
By channelling funds through …nancial intermediaries consumers avoid a costly duplication of monitoring e¤ort that would occur in an equilibrium with direct lending between them and …rms-see Williamson (1986) for more detail. Likewise, in the environment under study, it is optimal for a …rm to borrow from only one intermediary at a time.
Suppose a …rm reports that the productivity on its project in a given period is j , which may di¤er from the true state i . The intermediary can devote resources, m j , to verify this claim. The probability of detecting fraud is increasing in the amount of resources devoted to this activity. In particular, let P ij (m j =k) denote the probability that the …rm is caught cheating conditional on the following: (1) the true realization of productivity is i ; (2) the …rm makes a report of j ; (3) the intermediary spends m j in monitoring; (4) the total amount of borrowing is k (which represents the size of the project). The function P ij (m j =k)
is assumed to be monotonically increasing in m j =k. Additionally, let P ij (m j =k) = 0 if the …rm truthfully reports that its type is i . Any lender to the …rm must monitor the whole project to detect cheating, because his claim to pro…ts will depend on the total level of receipts vis à vis the total amount of disbursements paid out to others. Borrowing through a single intermediary then avoids a costly duplication of monitoring e¤ort.
A convenient formulation for P ij (m j =k) is
for a report j 6 = i and m j =k > 1= ;
0;
for a report j = i or m j =k 1= :
To guarantee that P ij (m j =k) 0, this speci…cation requires that some threshold level of monitoring, m j > k= , must be exceeded to detect cheating. Note that this threshold level of monitoring can be made arbitrarily small by picking a large enough value for ". Figure 2 makes this clear, while illustrating the function P ij (m j =k).
Monitoring is a produced good, measured in units of consumption. The production of monitoring is project speci…c. Monitoring produced for detecting fraud in one project cannot be used in a di¤erent one. Let monitoring be produced in line with the production function convex in the state of the monitoring production technology, z. Figure 2 portrays the cost of monitoring in terms of labor, or plots C(m=z; w)=w. Now, exactly which …rms are funded depends on three things: (1) the …rm's type, ;
(2) the state of the monitoring production technology in the …nancial intermediation sector, z; (3) the expense of monitoring e¤ort as re ‡ected by the wage, w. As will be seen, when the variance of a …rm's project becomes larger, the informational problems associated with contracting become more severe. Therefore, high variance projects are less likely to get funded, ceteris paribus.
IV The Financial Contract
A contract between a …rm and an intermediary is summarized by the quadruple fk; p j ; p ij ; m j g.
Here k represents the amount of capital lent by the intermediary to the …rm, p j is the …rm's payment to the intermediary if it reports j and is not found cheating, p ij is payment to the bank if the borrower reports j and monitoring reveals that productivity is i 6 = j , and m j is the intermediary's monitoring e¤ort when j is reported. Denote the value of the …rm's outside option by v. The value for v is determined in competitive equilibrium.
The intermediary chooses the details of the …nancial contract, fk; p j ; p ij ; m j g, to maximize its pro…ts. The contract is designed to have two features: (1) it entices truthful reporting by …rms; (2) it o¤ers …rms an expected return of v. The optimization problem is
Note that the cost of capital, e r, is given by e r = b r + ; i.e., the interest paid to investors plus the depreciation on capital. The …rst four constraints just say the intermediary cannot demand more than the …rm earns; that is, the …rm has limited liability. Equations (7) and (8) are the incentive-compatibility constraints. Take (8). This simply states that the expected return to the …rm from reporting state one when it actually is in state two, as given by the left-hand side, must be less than telling the truth, as represented by the right-hand side.
Observe that the constraint set is not convex due to the way that m 1 enters (8). Therefore, the second-order conditions for the maximization problem are important to consider. The last constraint (9) speci…es that the contract must o¤er the …rm an expected return equal to v, its option value outside. A …rm's outside option is the expected return that it could earn on a loan from another intermediary. This will be pinned down in equilibrium. Finally, note the solution for fp j ; p ij ; m j ; kg is contingent upon the …rm's type, = ( 1 ; 2 ). To conserve on notation, this dependence is generally suppressed.
The lemma below characterizes the solution to the above optimization problem.
Lemma 1 (Terms of the Contract) The solution to problem (P2) is described by:
1. The size of the loan from the intermediary to the …rm, k, is
2. The amount of monitoring per unit of capital when the …rm reports a bad state, m 1 =k, solves the problem
where k can be eliminated using (10) above.
(a) Monitoring in the bad state is simply given by
where m 1 =k solves (P3).
(b) The intermediary does not monitor when the …rm reports a good state so that
3. The payment schedule is
Proof. See Greenwood, Sanchez and Wang (2009, Appendix) , which contains proofs for all of the lemmas and propositions.
It is intuitive that there are no bene…ts to the …rm from claiming a better outcome than it actually realizes, since it will only have to pay the intermediary more. Therefore, cheating is only a problem in the high state. The intermediary would like to reduce the …rm's incentive to report being in the low state when it is in a high state. So, suppose the …rm reports a low state. If cheating is not detected, then the …rm pays all of the revenue (minus labor cost) that would be realized in the low state-see (12) . If the …rm is caught cheating, then it must surrender all of the revenue (sans labor cost) that it earns in the high state-see (15). Note that due to the incentive-compatibility constraints a false report will never occur so that the payments shown by (14) and (15) do not occur in equilibrium.
The contract speci…es that the intermediary should only monitor the …rm when it reports a bad outcome (state 1) on its project-see (11). Monitoring in the low state is done to maximize the intermediary's pro…ts, subject to the incentive-compatibility cum promisekeeping constraint (10), as problem (P3) dictates. Note that the higher is the value of the …rm, v, the bigger must be the loan, k, to satisfy the incentive-compatibility cum promisekeeping constraint (10). This constraint (10) ensures that the contract provides the …rm an expected return equal to what it would earn if it misrepresented the outcome in the good state, 2 (r 2 r 1 )[1 P 21 (m 1 =k)]k. Furthermore, this expected return is set equal to the …rm's outside option, v. The size of the loan, k, is increasing in the amount of monitoring that occurs in the low state, m 1 =k. This happens because the probability of the …rm not getting caught from misrepresenting its revenues, 1 P 21 (m 1 =k), is decreasing in the intermediary's monitoring activity.
Now, a …nancial contract will be o¤ered by an intermediary to a …rm only if it yields the former nonnegative pro…ts, I( ; v) 0. Suppose that r 1 < e r. A necessary condition for a contract to yield nonnegative pro…ts is for the intermediary to devote more than the minimal level of resources per unit of funds lent, 1= , to monitoring a report of a bad state.
If this is not done, the …rm will always claim that it is in the low state, and the intermediary can only earn a loss on the contract. Brie ‡y consider the case where r 1 e r. Here the …rm's return on capital in its worst state of nature is at least as large as the cost of capital, e r.
Firms would desire to borrow an in…nite amount of capital. An equilibrium will not exist.
Assumption: r 1 = R( 1 ; w) < e r = b r + , for all …rm types.
Later, a lower bound on the level of productivity in the …nancial sector, , will be imposed that guarantees that this assumption holds whenever z > . This lower bound ensures that the equilibrium wage, w, is high enough so that the assumption will always hold-see (2).
Lemma 2 (Interior solution for monitoring) m 1 =k > 1= , for all v > 0.
V Competitive Financial Intermediation
In the economy there is perfect competition in the …nancial sector. Consequently, an intermediary must o¤er a contract that maximizes a …rm's value, subject to the restriction that the former does not incur a loss. If an intermediary failed to do so it would be undercut by others. The upshot is that intermediaries will make zero pro…ts on each type of loan.
Furthermore, for a …rm to produce, it must make positive pro…ts too. It is intuitive that for all this to happen a project must o¤er some potential for a surplus or that 1 r 1 + 2 r 2 > e r;
i.e., the expected return on capital must exceed its cost. Assume this. The value of a …rm, v, is then determined by the condition
The implications of perfect competition will now be analyzed. Key questions are: (ii) What will be the loan size? (ii) Which …rms will get funded?
The size of a loan for a project, k, can now be determined. To do this, substitute (10) in Problem (P3) and solve for the optimal level of monitoring, m 1 =k. Plug this solution for monitoring in the objective function for (P3) to obtain a formula for I( ; v). 
=(
( 1 r 1 + 2 r 2 e r)
Equation (17) gives a determinate loan size for each type of funded project. Furthermore, funding is increasing in a project's expected return and is decreasing in its volatility.
Lemma 3 (Loan size) The level of investment in a …rm, k, is increasing in its expected net return, 1 r 1 + 2 r 2 e r, and the state of technology in the …nancial sector, z, and is decreasing in the variance of the return, r 2 r 1 (holding the wage rate, w, …xed).
Attention will now be directed toward determining which projects will be funded. Consider the set of …rms, A(w), de…ned by (18) A(w) f : 1 r 1 + 2 r 2 e r > 0g:
Intuitively, one might expect that this set of projects will be funded in equilibrium because they o¤er an expected return on capital, 1 r 1 + 2 r 2 , that is greater than its user cost, e r.
This turns out to be true. The contracting problem (P2) implies that the …rm will never make negative pro…ts, given (3) to (6). The construction of equation (17) suggests that the intermediary will be able to make a loan in this situation, and not incur a loss.
Lemma 4 (The set of funded …rms) A necessary and su¢ cient condition for a type-…rm to be active or funded, or for k( ) > 0; I( ; V ( )) = 0 and V ( ) > 0, is that 2 A(w). ( 1 w)
This solution presumes that r 1 < e r, so there is an interior solution for monitoring, and that 1 r 1 + 2 r 2 > e r. It is easy to see that the intermediary's pro…t function, I( ; v), is \ shaped with the following properties: Therefore, as was mentioned in the introduction, a simple threshold rule exists for funding, as characterized by (18). Call A(w) the set of active …rms. From (2) it is easy to see that 1 r 1 + 2 r 2 e r = (1 )
2 ] e r > 0:
Observe that the …rm's pro…ts are decreasing in wages. A type-…rm will operate when w < W ( ), and will not otherwise, where the cuto¤ wage, W ( ), is speci…ed by
So, the set of active projects A(w) can be expressed equivalently as
The active set depends on the wage because r i = R( i ; w). It contracts (expands) with a rise (decrease) in the real wage, since R( i ; w) is decreasing in w. In equilibrium the wage rate, w, turns out to be increasing function of the state of technology in the …nancial sector, z. Hence, the active set will shrink with technological improvement in the …nancial sector, or a rise in z. This will become clearer in Section VII. 
VI Stationary Equilibrium
The focus of the analysis is on stationary equilibria. First, the labor-market-clearing condition for the model will be presented. Second, a de…nition for a stationary equilibrium will be given. Third, it will be demonstrated that a stationary equilibrium for the model exists.
On the demand side for labor, only …rms with 2 A(w) will be producing output. On the supply side, recall that the economy has one unit of labor in aggregate. The labormarket-clearing condition will then appear as
It is now time to take stock of the situation so far by presenting a de…nition of the equilibrium under study. It will be assumed that the economy rests in a stationary state where the cost of capital is e r = b r + .
De…nition 1 Set the steady-state cost of capital at e r. A stationary competitive equilibrium is described by a set of labor allocations, l and l m , a …nancial contract, fp 1 ; p 2 ; p 12 ; p 21 ; k; m 1 ; m 2 g, a set of active monitored …rms, A(w), …rm values v, and a wage rate, w, such that:
1. The …nancial intermediary o¤ers a contract, fp 1 ; p 2 ; p 12 ; p 21 ; k; m 1 ; m 2 g, which maximizes its pro…ts, I, in accordance with (P2), given the cost of capital and wages, e r and w, and the value of …rms, v. The intermediary hires labor for monitoring in the amount l m = (m=z) .
2. The …nancial contract o¤ered by the intermediary maximizes the value of a …rm, v, in line with (16), given the prices e r and w.
3. A …rm is o¤ered a contract if and only if it lies in the active set, A(w), as de…ned by (18), given e r and w. It hires labor, l, so as to maximize its pro…ts in accordance with (P1), given, w, and the size of the loan, k, o¤ered by the intermediary.
4. The wage rate, w, is determined so that the labor market clears, in accordance with (21).
(iv) (iii) When will an equilibrium exist for the economy under study? To address this question, let 1 maxf 1 : ( 1 ; 2 ) 2 T , over all 2 g. Next, de…ne the constant ! by the equation (22) R( 1 ; !) = e r:
The constant ! speci…es a lower bound on the feasible equilibrium wage rate. 2 When w = ! for a type-( 1 ; 2 ) project it will happen that r 1 = e r. In this situation the intermediary could simply ask for a payment of r 1 k in both states of the world and engage in no monitoring. It would earn zero pro…ts. The …rm's pro…ts would be 2 (r 2 r 1 )k. It would desire a loan of in…nite size. Therefore, as the equilibrium wage, w, approaches ! from above the equilibrium de…ned above will eventually become tenuous.
The situation is portrayed in Figure 4 , which graphs the demand and supply for labor.
The demand for labor is portrayed by the solid line labeled L. The properties of this demand schedule are established during the course of the proof for Lemma 5-see Greenwood, Sanchez and Wang (2009, Appendix) . Demand is downward sloping in w. The question is whether or not it will cross the vertical supply schedule for labor. Now, at a given wage rate, loan size increases with more e¢ cient intermediation. This leads to more labor being demanded when intermediation improves. In other words, it can be shown that the demand for labor schedule rotates rightward with an upward movement in z. Now, de…ne as the level of z such that the demand curve intersects the supply curve at the point (1; !).
Lemma 5 (Existence of an equilibrium) There is a constant such that for all z > there exists a stationary equilibrium for the economy.
VII The Impact of Technological Progress on the Economy
The primary goal of the analysis is to understand how technological advance in the …nancial sector a¤ects the economy. To this end, the impact that technological progress, in either the Demand, Supply Figure 4 : Existence, demand and supply for labor …nancial or production sector, has on the portfolio of funded projects will be characterized.
To develop some intuition for the economy under study, some special cases will be examined.
A Balanced Growth
In the …rst special case, technological progress in the …nancial sector proceeds in balance with the rest of the economy. Speci…cally, the economy may move along a balanced growth path when the 1= i 's grow at the common rate g 1= and z grows at rate g
1=(1
) .
3
Therefore, F t+1 ( 1 ; 2 ) = F t ( 1 =g; 2 =g). The salient features of this case are summarized by the proposition below.
Proposition 1 (Balanced growth) Let the 1= i 's grow at rate g 1= and z increases at rate g
1=(1
) . There exists a balanced growth path where the capital stock, k, wages, w, and rents, v, will all grow at rate g
) . The amount of resources devoted to monitoring per unit of capital, m 1 =k, remains constant.
In this situation the …nancial sector is not becoming more e¢ cient over time, relative to the rest of the economy. The amount of monitoring done per unit of capital invested remains constant over time. Thus, the probability of a …rm getting caught by misrepresenting a high level of earnings, P 21 (m 1 =k), is constant over time too. For any particular project type, the spread between the return on capital (net of labor costs) and its user cost, 1 r 1 + 2 r 2 e r, is …xed over time. The existence of a balanced growth path results from the fact that the probability of detection, P 21 (m 1 =k), depends on the employment of monitoring services relative to the size of the loan.
B Unbalanced Growth
The above case suggests that for technological progress in the …nancial sector to have an impact it must outpace advance in the rest of the economy. Suppose that this is the case.
Then, one would expect that as monitoring becomes more e¢ cient those projects o¤ering the lowest expected return will be cut.
3 In order to get a …xed interest rate assume that the consumer/worker has isoelastic preferences over consumption. Then, in standard fashion, along a balanced growth path, b r = g =(1 ) = 1, where is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
Proposition 2 (Technological progress in …nancial intermediation) Consider z and z 0 with z < z 0 . Let w and w 0 be the wage rates associated with z and z 0 , respectively. Then, A(w 0 ) A(w). Additionally, if = ( 1 ; 2 ) 2 A(w) A(w 0 ) and 0 = (
An increase in z makes …nancial intermediation more e¢ cient. For any given wage rate, w, the aggregate demand for labor will increase for two reasons. First, more capital will be lent to each funded project. Second, more labor will also be hired by the intermediary to monitor the project. Since the demand for labor rises, the wage rate must move up to clear the labor market. This increase in wages causes the set of active projects, A(w), to shrink, with the projects o¤ering the lowest expected return being culled.
Alternatively, technological advance could occur in the production sector and not the …nancial one. Here, the lack of development in the …nancial sector will hinder growth in the rest of the economy. Speci…cally, technological advance in the production sector of the economy will drive up wages. This leads to the costs of monitoring rising. Therefore, less is done. This lack of scrutiny by intermediaries now allows …rms with marginal projects o¤ering low-expected returns to receive funding.
Proposition 3 (Technological progress in production) Suppose all the 1= i 's increase by the factor g 1= , holding z …xed. Then, the set of active projects, A(w), expands with the new projects o¤ering lower expected returns than the old ones.
C E¢ cient Finance
An extreme example of Proposition 2 would be to assume that z grows forever. Then, the …nancial sector will become in…nitely e¢ cient relative to the rest of the economy. This leads to the fourth special case.
Proposition 4 (E¢ cient …nance) Suppose T is a compact and countable subset of R 2 + , with a positive measure of projects for each type, = ( 1 ; 2 ). Then,
2. lim (23) lim
7.
(24) lim
As the cost of monitoring borrowers drops, the intermediation sector becomes increasingly e¢ cient. The …nancial intermediary can then perfectly police loan payments without devoting a signi…cant amount of resources in terms of labor to this activity, as points (2) and (3) in the proposition make clear. Since …rms are operating constant-returns-to-scale production technologies, no rents will accrue on their activity-see point (5). Firms must pay the full marginal product of capital to the intermediary-point (4). That is, the spread between a …rm's internal rate of return (before depreciation), 1 r 1 + 2 r 2 , and the user cost of capital, e r = b r + , vanishes, where the latter is made of the interest paid to savors, b r, and rate of depreciation, . In this world only projects with the highest return are …nanced, as point (1) states, even though they may be the most risky. In the aggregate any idiosyncratic project risk washes out. Therefore, in the absence of a contracting problem, only the mean return on investment matters. And, with constant-returns-to-scale technologies everything should be directed to the most pro…table opportunity. The wage rate, w , and aggregate capital stock, k , in the e¢ cient economy are determined in standard fashion by the conditions that the expected marginal product of capital for the most pro…table projects must equal the user cost of capital, e r, and the fact that the labor market must clear. These two conditions yield (24) Here w
in the formulae are due to two facts that pertain to the current setting: (i) the best projects from a portfolio T are chosen; (ii) there is uncertainty in .)
VIII Conclusions
What is the link between the state of …nancial intermediation and economic development?
This question is explored here by embedding a costly-state veri…cation framework into the standard neoclassical growth paradigm. The model has two novel ingredients. As in the standard costly-state veri…cation paradigm, the ex post return on a project is private information and an intermediary can audit the reported return. The …rst ingredient is that likelihood of a successful audit is increasing and concave in the amount of resources devoted to monitoring. The cost of auditing is increasing and convex in the amount of resources spent on this activity. Second, there is a distribution over …rm type, each type o¤ering a di¤erent combination of risk and return.
Two key features follow from these ingredients. First, a …nancial theory of …rm size results. All …rms are funded that earn an expected return greater than the cost of raising capital from savers. Funding is increasing in a project's expected return, and decreasing in its variance. The size of a …rm is limited by diminishing returns in information production.
Second, a Goldsmithian (1969) link is created between the state of …nancial development and economic development. The presence of informational frictions leads to a distortion between the expected marginal product of capital and its user cost, the interest paid to savers plus capital consumption. This distortion is modelled endogenously here. As the e¢ cacy of auditing increases, due to technological progress in the …nancial sector, the size of this distortion shrinks. The upshot is an increase in the economy's income. Intuitively, the rise in income derives from three e¤ects: (a) as the spread shrinks there is more overall capital accumulation in the economy; (b) capital is redirected toward the most productive investment opportunities in the economy; (c) less labor is required to monitor loans which frees up resources for the economy.
There are two natural extensions of the above framework. The …rst would be to allow for long-term contracts. On this, Wang (2005) In a competitive world such contracts may be severely limited by the ability of each party to leave the relationship at any point in time and seek a better partner.
Second, a dynamic contracting version of the developed framework could be taken to the cross-country data to measure the importance of …nancial intermediation in economy development. Greenwood, Sanchez and Wang (2009) 
IX Appendix-Proofs for Lemmas and Propositions in Greenwood, Sanchez and Wang
Proof for Lemma 1. First, substitute the promise-keeping constraint (9) into the objective function to rewrite it as
Next, it is almost trivial to see that optimality will dictate that p 12 = r 1 k and p 21 = r 2 k, since this costlessly relaxes the incentive constraints (7) and (8). Next, drop the incentive constraint (7) from problem (P2) to obtain the auxiliary problem now displayed:
The strategy will be to solve problem (P4) …rst. Then, it will be shown that (P2) and (P4) are equivalent. Problem (P4) will now be solved. To this end, note the following points:
1. The incentive constraint (27) is binding. To see why, suppose not. Then, reduce m 1 to increase the objective.
2. The constraint (26) is not binding. Assume, to the contrary, it is. Then, (27) is violated. This happens because the right-hand side is zero. Yet, the left-hand side is positive, given that p 1 r 1 k < r 2 k, so that [1 P 21 (m 1 =k)](r 2 k p 1 ) > 0. (25) is binding. Again, suppose not, so that p 1 < r 1 k. It will be shown that exists a pro…table feasible deviation from any contract where this constraint is slack. Speci…cally, consider increasing k very slightly by dk > 0 while adjusting p 1 and p 2 in the following manner so that (27) and (28) still hold. Also, hold m 1 …xed. The implied perturbations for p 1 and p 2 are given by 2 4 dp 1 dp 2
The constraint
Note that such an increase in k will raise the objective function.
It will now be demonstrated that the optimization problems (P2) and (P4) are equivalent.
First, note that e I( ; v) I( ; v), because problem (P4) does not impose the constraint (7).
It will now be established that e I( ; v) I( ; v). Consider a solution to problem (P4). It will be shown that this solution is feasible for (P2). On this, note that point 1 implies that
Now, set m 2 = 0 in (P2), which is feasible but not necessarily optimal. Then, constraint (7) becomes p 1 p 2 , which is satis…ed by the solution to (P4). Therefore, e I( ; v) I( ; v).
Last, with the above facts in hand, recast the optimization problem as
subject to r 2 k p 2 = (r 2 r 1 )k[1 P 21 (m 1 =k)]; cf (27); and r 2 k p 2 = v= 2 , cf (28):
The above two constraints collapse in the single constraint (10), by eliminating r 2 k p 2 , that involves just m 1 and k. The problem then appears as (P3).
Proof for Lemma 2. Suppose that the solution dictates that m 1 =k 1= . Then, from (P3) it is clear that the optimal solution will dictate that m 1 =k = 0. This happens because P 21 (m 1 =k) = 0 for all m 1 =k 1= , yet monitoring costs are positive for all m 1 =k > 0. Next, by substituting (10) into (P3) it is easy to deduce that the intermediary's pro…t function can be written as
Therefore pro…ts are negative if r 1 < e r and v > 0. Hence, a contract will not be o¤ered when m 1 =k 1= .
Proof for Lemma 3. Clear from equation (17).
Proof for Lemma 4. Necessity: From problem (P3) it is clear that the intermediary will incur a loss when 1 r 1 + 2 r 2 e r 0 and v > 0, for any 2 A(w), because m 1 =k > 1=
by Lemma 2.
Su¢ ciency: Suppose that 1 r 1 + 2 r 2 e r > 0 for some 2 T . By equation (17) it is immediate that the intermediary will issue a loan k > 0. By construction it will earn zero pro…ts on this loan. Recall that the derivation of (17), discussed in the text, used a solution for v. This solution is
Therefore, the …rm will earn positive rents too.
Proof for Lemma 5. To begin with let k = K(w; ; z) represent capital stock that will be employed by a type-…rm when productivity in the …nancial sector is z and the wage rate is w > !. Similarly, let m 1 =z = M (w; ; z) denote the amount of monitoring services, relative to z, that will be devoted to this project. Given this notation, the expected demand for labor by both the …rm and intermediary for a project of type is
Note that this demand is only speci…ed for 2 A(w) and w > !, where ! is de…ned by (22) . In order to characterize L(w; ; z); the properties of its components K(w; ; z) and M (w; ; z) must be developed when 2 A(w) and w > !. First, take K(w; ; z). On this, rewrite equation (17) as
where i (1 )
Note the following things about this solution for k: (i) The level of investment in a …rm, k , is continuous and strictly decreasing in w;
(when z is …nite); (iii) k is continuous and strictly increasing in z.
Now, switch attention to the second term in L(w; ; z). A formula for M (w; ; z) can be derived in the same manner as the one for K(w; ; z). It is
where
) . Note the following things about this solution for m 1 =z: (i) m 1 =z is continuous and strictly decreasing in w; . From (32) it can be deduced that K(w; ; z) will grow at rate g
1=(1
) . Therefore, the …rst term in braces in (35) will be constant. Equation (33) implies that M (w; ; z), or the second term, will be constant too. The active set A(w) will not change-equation (20).
Therefore, labor demand remains constant. Hence, the conjectured solution for the rate of growth in wages is true. Using (30) is easy to calculate that v will grow at rate g
Last, since M (w; ; z) is constant it must be the case that m 1 is growing at the same rate as z, or g
) . Therefore, m 1 =k will remain unchanged along a balanced growth path.
Proof for Proposition 2. First, point 2 in the proof of Lemma 5 established that the aggregate demand for labor is continuous and strictly increasing in z. Therefore, at a given wage rate the demand for labor rises as z moves up. In order for equilibrium in the labor market to be restored, wages must increase, since the demand for labor is decreasing in wages-point 1. Last, recall from (19) that a type-project will only be funded when 
It's trivial to see that as w rises the set of 2 T satisfying this restriction, or A(w), shrinks; if = ( 1 ; 2 ) ful…lls the restriction for some wage it will meet it for all lower ones too, yet there will exist a higher wage that will not satisfy it. Furthermore, observe that W ( ) is strictly increasing in 1 1= 1 + 2 1= 2 . Therefore, those 's o¤ering the lowest expected return will be cut …rst as w rises, because they have the lowest threshold wage.
Proof for Proposition 3. Let the 1= i 's increase by the common factor g 1= > 1.
Suppose that wages increase in response by the proportion g
) . Will the labor-marketclearing condition (35) still hold? The answer is no, because the demand for labor will fall.
Take the …rst term behind the integral, which gives the demand for labor by a …rm. From (32) it is clear that K(w; ; z) will rise by a factor less than g 1=(1 ) , when z is held …xed.
Therefore, the …rst term in braces in (35) will decline. Turn to the second term. From (33) it is easy to see that M (w; ; z) will drop under the conjecture solution. Therefore, wages must rise by less than g 1=(1 ) , since the demand for labor is decreasing in w (as was established in the proof of Lemma 5). The active set, A(w), will therefore expand, because 1 r 1 + 2 r 2 increases-see (18).
Proof for Proposition 4. The set of projects in T o¤ering the highest expected return is given by A = arg max[
By assumption R A dF > 0. Take any equilibrium wage w. From (20) it is immediate that if 2 A then 2 A(w), since 1 r 1 + 2 r 2 e r = (1 ) To see why, suppose alternatively that w ! e w 6 = w . First, presume that e w < w . Then, by (19) all projects of type 2 A will be funded since their cuto¤ wage is W ( ) = w > e w.
From equations (31), (32) and (34) This establishes (23). Last, note that A(w ) = A .
It is immediate that A lim w"w A(w), because 2 A is viable for all wages w w = W ( ) by (19). It is also true that lim w"w A(w) A , since from (19) any project = 2 A requires an upper bound on wages W ( ) < w to survive; that is, for any = 2
A there will exist some high enough wage w such that W ( ) < w < w . Therefore, lim w"w A(w) = A = A(w ). This establishes point 1 of the Proposition.
To have an equilibrium it must be the case that m 1 =z < 1 for 2 A , otherwise the demand for labor would be in…nitely large. From equation (33) It is apparent that lim z!1 m 1 =k = 1; because 1 r 1 + 2 r 2 ! e r. Consequently, a false report by a …rm will be caught with certainty, or lim 
